Maneuver Warfare for the Mind, Educating for thinking and judgment by Barrett, Sean F.X. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2021-06
Maneuver Warfare for the Mind, Educating for
thinking and judgment
Barrett, Sean F.X.; Augier, Mie; Wilson, G.I.; Wyly, Michael D.
Marine Corps Association
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67357
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
38 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • June 2021
I
n a recent article, we noted that 
MCDP 7, Learning is a useful 
starting point for explaining why 
learning is so important to the 
profession of arms and is a necessary 
first step to combatting some remnants 
of anti-intellectualism in the Corps’ 
ranks.3 That was its key purpose, and 
it successfully began what we hope will 
be a lasting conversation and broader 
movement that embraces learning and 
thinking in the Marine Corps and per-
haps even inspires other organizations 
to start similar initiatives. 
MCPD 7, however, did not set out 
to address some fundamental aspects 
relating to the how that are necessary 
for improving our learning and think-
ing capabilities, progressing beyond an 
industrial era mindset, and preparing 
ourselves for great power competition. 
Complementing the why, we must 
also address how to develop judgment. 
Knowledge and skills are not the only 
goals of learning, as MCDP 7 suggests,4
but their application is as well. Another 
possible extension to MCDP 7 relates to 
the ideas of a “learning organization” 
and “organizational learning.” While 
the terms are mentioned a total of six 
times, the publication never explains 
how individual learning contributes to 
organizational learning and vice versa. 
MCDP 7 also takes a mostly narrow, in-
centives-based approach to its discussion 
of intrinsic motivation and as a result 
overlooks how to inspire an enthusi-
asm in our Marines that looks beyond 
incentives to fulfilling our professional 
calling and living up to our identity as 
Marines.
We hope to help start filling in some 
of these gaps by sharing a few of Col 
Mike Wyly and Col G.I. Wilson’s expe-
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“My intent in PME is to teach military judgment rather 
than knowledge. Knowledge is of course important 
for developing judgment, but should be taught in the 
context of teaching military judgment, not as material 
to be memorized.” 1
—Gen Al Gray
“We talk about Marines being able to take intelligent 
initiative based on a changing situation; that’s the es-
sence of maneuver warfare, and that requires our Ma-
rines to be much, much smarter than we have been in 
the past.” 2
—MajGen William F. Mullen
Ideas & Issues (LearnIng, TraInIng & PMe)
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riences and the learning methodologies 
they used during the original maneuver 
warfare movement to develop judgment 
in our Marines. First, we focus on for-
mal professional military education and 
Col Wyly’s time teaching maneuver 
warfare and decision making as Head 
of Tactics Instruction at Amphibious 
Warfare School (AWS). Then, we dis-
cuss the operating forces and Gen Al 
Gray’s establishing the Maneuver War-
fare Board at 2d MarDiv when he was 
commanding general. These formal or-
ganizational mechanisms inspired and 
created synergies with informal study 
groups consisting of passionate Marines 
(and non-Marines) who studied on their 
own and gathered to debate, refine, and 
contribute ideas to the conceptual de-
velopment of maneuver warfare. They 
were motivated out of a sense of duty 
to their profession, their organization, 
and their fellow Marines. These orga-
nizational mechanisms and learning 
methodologies combined to form a 
learning organization. 
Educating for Thinking and Judg-
ment: Examples and Practices
Teaching maneuver warfare at AWS. 
Col Wyly believes the human mind 
is like a muscle: the more you use it, 
the better it gets. In teaching tactics, 
however, this does not mean encourag-
ing the rote memorization of prescribed 
solutions. Rather, Marines need to 
exercise the thought process of look-
ing for opportunities and weaknesses 
to exploit and avoiding entrapments. 
Unfortunately, after LtGen Bernard 
“Mick” Trainor ordered Wyly to as-
sume the position of Head of Tactics 
Instruction at AWS before the 1979–80 
school year, Wyly quickly realized the 
“approved” lesson plans had changed 
little since he attended TBS in 1963 
and AWS in 1972—sixteen years and 
one war later. They took an industrial 
age approach to learning and teaching, 
focused on set piece engagements, and, 
to make matters worse, were boring. 
There are many problems with this 
methodical, industrial age approach. 
The enemy does not get a vote.6 It ad-
vances the notion of perfect assump-
tions and perfect answers, which may 
make sense in a static and stable world, 
but not one in which any of us live, and 
it subscribes to the theory that teaching 
is a matter of imparting knowledge and 
not developing the judgment needed to 
face ill-structured problems to which 
rules and formulas do not apply. At 
AWS in particular, following exercises, 
instructors handed out schoolhouse so-
lutions known as “The Yellows.” They 
were the “right” answer, as thought of 
and approved by the faculty and director 
in their “infinite wisdom.” They were al-
ways printed on yellow paper—thus, the 
name. Wyly observed that the Yellows 
shut down thinking and intellectual 
inquiry and aroused unproductive dis-
sent. Born from an instinctive predilec-
tion to challenge authority, discussions 
between the captains and instructors 
quickly degenerated into an “us” versus 
“them” game of “I know better than 
you.” Handing out prescribed solutions 
also implicitly suggested that thought 
was not actually required in tactics. 
Rather, tactics was simply a matter of 
following a step-by-step methodology. 
Upon taking over, Wyly also ob-
served the curriculum for the tactics 
“Maneuver warfare cannot be taught through me-
thodical teaching ... Before 1989, Marines learned 
from an instructor who stood on a stage with a pointer 
and lectured ... He began by giving them definitions to 
learn ... Field exercises eventually followed the lec-
tures. Yet they, too, were set pieces ... leaders did not 
learn to make decisions so much as they were taught 
a decision-making process, a methodology outlined 
step by step in a book that no commander is ever 
known to have actually followed in a real war.” 5
—Col Wyly
Sand-table exercises and tactical-decision games are simple, effective teaching/learning 
methods. (Photo by PFC Nicole Rogge.)
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course focused overwhelmingly on plan-
ning. In contrast, Wyly preferred action. 
Students could not be expected to plan 
without first having been educated in 
what to plan for. Wyly wanted to change 
this, and Trainor gave him the latitude 
and direction to draw on his experiences 
as a rifle company commander in Viet-
nam and as a recent military and Rus-
sian history graduate student at George 
Washington University to revitalize the 
curriculum and make it more relevant 
to preparing Marines for combat. His 
experiences remain relevant today, both 
for understanding some of the historical 
details and intellectual and institutional 
foundations involved in reinvigorating 
maneuver warfare, as well as for others 
interested in developing judgment.
Wyly believed discussions between 
students and their instructor under-
pinned any scholarly course, especially 
one focused on combat tactics. He had 
discovered during his graduate studies 
that class discussions flowed more flu-
idly when students had read the same 
materials, so he began to turn certain 
lectures into book studies. “What did 
you get out of David Chandler’s The 
Campaigns of Napoleon? Robert Heinl’s 
Victory at High Tide?” He never told 
students what they should take away 
in advance because he wanted to en-
courage and invigorate thinking among 
his officers so they and the instructor 
could learn from one another. These 
discussions inspired even more reading 
and discussions outside the classroom. 
A small study group formed organically 
and started meeting every Friday night 
to discuss warfare and write articles to 
publish in the Gazette.
Wyly also believed his students 
needed to practice decision making 
with incomplete information and under 
conditions of uncertainty in order to 
improve their ability to do so, much like 
running improved their physical fitness. 
Before class, Wyly found a chalkboard 
and drew a layout of the terrain that 
would become the area of operations 
into which his students would project 
themselves as they practiced “combat 
decision making.” At the beginning of 
class, Wyly provided the students all 
they would know if they were really 
there: the time, weather, terrain, type 
and number of forces under their com-
mand, what (little) they knew about 
their enemy, their mission, the focus 
of effort, and the commander’s intent 
one and two echelons up. After clari-
fying whether there was anything his 
students did not understand, he picked 
a student, introduced a new develop-
ment into the scenario, and forced the 
student to exercise his mind and make 
a decision. Students initially tried to 
feel Wyly out by asking questions to 
see if they were on the right track, but 
Wyly wanted them to act: “What are 
you going to do, captain?!” Wyly saw 
firsthand that this decision-forcing 
approach worked. Students learned to 
think, exercise judgment, and decide 
and act in situations with only limited 
rationality and information instead of 
waiting for more. Such active learning 
approaches are crucial to our ability to 
move beyond our industrial age training 
and education model to one of thinking 
and judgment.
Wyly’s emphasis on decision making 
was integrated with his understanding 
of Col John Boyd’s OODA (observe-
orient-decide-act) Loop, which Wyly 
learned in almost daily conversations 
with Boyd himself. Wyly preferred not 
to overemphasize the concept, believing 
his students should instead focus on 
identifying enemy vulnerabilities and 
how best to exploit them. However, 
there was always the reminder that if 
you did not act quickly and decisively 
enough, the enemy might already be 
applying a new and different initiative 
against you. Thus, the OODA Loop 
is not a decision-making checklist but 
rather a constant reminder that in a 
changing situation, good ideas only 
work if they are applied quickly and 
decisively. 
2d MarDiv Maneuver Warfare Board
One unfortunate aspect of organiza-
tional behavior is that large organiza-
tions rarely change. Even the best ideas 
rarely overcome the inertias that perme-
ate organizations, especially at the head-
quarters level, and rules and regulations 
stifle innovative and creative thinking 
that could lead to change. Gen Gray 
understood these limitations and thus 
embarked on a bottom-up approach to 
change in order to generate enthusiasm 
for maneuver thinking and the ideas 
undergirding it and build maneuver 
thinking into the organization and its 
members.
One of Gray’s key initiatives as the 
CG, 2d MarDiv was the 2d MarDiv 
Maneuver Warfare Board, which served 
as a clearinghouse for generating and 
refining maneuver ideas in rigorous 
debates, as a mechanism for teaching 
maneuver warfare to the division, and 
as an avenue for experimenting and test-
ing these ideas in the field. While this 
initiative itself did not last past Gen 
Gray’s tenure as CG, it helped produce 
lasting intellectual and organizational 
changes that introduced maneuver war-
fare thinking to young Marines and 
made evangelists of them.7 One core 
member of the board was Capt G.I. 
Wilson, who had been inspired by the 
words and ideas of then BGen Gray, 
Capt Steve Miller, Maj William Fite, 
Col Boyd, then LtCol Mike Wyly, and 
William Lind on combined arms, ma-
neuver, mobility, and deception.8 Their 
ideas resonated with Wilson, who had 
previous experience in outnumbered 
situations while serving as a police of-
ficer after leaving active duty.9
Wilson was stationed at Camp 
Lejeune in 1981 when his old OCS 
and TBS battle buddy, Bill Woods, re-
ceived orders from AWS to 2d MarDiv. 
Woods was a student of Wyly’s and was 
an active participant in the Friday night 
study group. He left AWS with advice 
from Wyly and the enthusiasm to start 
a maneuver warfare study group beyond 
AWS. The group Woods and Wilson 
helped form was a bottom-up, grass-
roots initiative driven by the energy 
and passion for ideas of relatively junior 
Marines. The group held a handful of 
meetings before Gen Gray checked in as 
the new CG. Gen Gray had already ad-
opted maneuver thinking, had similarly 
formed after hours study groups at his 
previous commands, and had already 
begun implementing and testing ma-
neuver principles, first in Vietnam and 
then while CG, 4th MAB in the mid- 
to late-1970s. Woods and Wilson met 
Gray at the Officers’ Club, where they 
discussed maneuver ideas. Gray directed 
them to arrange a dinner meeting to in-
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troduce him to their study group, which 
also included Captains Denny Long and 
Bob Semler and Majors Jim Marapoti 
and Dick Dietmeier. In October 1981, 
Gray issued an order establishing the 
2d MarDiv Maneuver Warfare Board, 
and this group formed its nucleus.10 The 
board served as an important mecha-
nism for organizational exploration, as 
well as for facilitating small group active 
learning and critical thinking skills.
In keeping with his approach to 
leadership and organizational change, 
Gray empowered and entrusted junior 
officers, whose actions and numbers 
dominated the board. For example, 
whenever there was an informal gather-
ing of maneuver study group personnel 
or a formal gathering of the board, Gray 
always made a point of asking junior 
officers and enlisted for their input first, 
thus allowing for respectful dissent and 
maverick thinking to emerge. Gray well 
understood the importance of trusted 
relationships between junior and senior 
personnel, as did Boyd. Junior Marines 
had the ethical, professional, and moral 
duty to question anything a commander 
said if they did not understand what 
the commander wanted to happen or 
the outcome he desired. However, this 
could only happen if trust relationships 
had been developed and fostered. Gray 
thus set in place the foundation for the 
learning environment and trust relation-
ships critical to judgment and decisive 
action.
Gray also “deployed” Woods, Wil-
son, and others to 2d MarDiv units and 
staff sections to begin educating young 
Marines in small groups on the tenets 
of maneuver warfare, thus planting and 
growing maneuver thinking throughout 
the division and establishing a larger 
base of grassroots support. The board 
members were still trying to learn ma-
neuver warfare themselves, but Gray 
believed there was no better way to learn 
than to teach. As one might expect, or-
ganizational discomfort with change 
manifested itself in disagreement and 
debate, especially from higher-ranking 
officers. To prepare for this pushback, 
the board and small study groups first 
challenged each other’s ideas internal-
ly before introducing them to a larger 
audience. The board and small study 
groups were akin to conceptual labo-
ratories, where ideas were introduced 
and then rigorously evaluated. 
While teaching across the division, 
the board cultivated an enthusiasm for 
reading, studying, and learning about 
the profession of arms. Gray always 
reminded his Marines it did not cost 
money to think. Marines were viewed as 
graduate students in warfare, and junior 
Marines, who were the most enthusias-
tic, oftentimes ended up knowing more 
than their seniors. This enthusiasm con-
tributed to the emergence of the intel-
lectual awakening of the Marine Corps. 
Encouraged by LtGen Trainor’s read-
ing list at Quantico’s Education Center 
and Gen Gray’s list, which ultimately 
became the Commandant’s Professional 
Reading List, reading became “popu-
lar” and was viewed as a professional 
duty and an expectation for everyone 
in the division, and the board prepared 
reading packets of short articles to help 
facilitate the understanding and assimi-
lation of maneuver thinking.11
Like Wyly, Gray always impressed 
upon his Marines that action is part of 
learning. The ideas introduced and then 
refined conceptually ultimately had to 
be tested in the field, which the board 
did in a form of prototype experimenta-
tion that integrated some core elements 
of adult learning with an operational 
and organizational skunk works. This 
effort to educate and prototype (i.e., 
test, experiment) seeded the vision for 
what would become the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory. Given the 
budgetary constraints at the time, the 
Marines of 2d MarDiv had to get cre-
ative. For example, sometimes exercise 
forces went to the field with quarter 
or half-full tanks of fuel, forcing them 
to be creative in how they adapted to 
limited logistical support and partial 
and imperfect information.12
These experiments culminated in 
“free play” exercises at Fort Pickett, 
which tested these ideas at a division-
wide level. A key aspect in preparing 
for these exercises was the education of 
the umpires and observers. Capt Woods 
worked hard to ensure they knew and 
understood relevant maneuver defini-
tions, concepts, and tenets and what 
they looked like in the field. During 
these exercises, junior Marines and offi-
cers experienced the benefits of maneu-
ver warfare firsthand, turning them into 
evangelists. Candid after-action reviews 
(AARs) followed each evolution. Dur-
ing one particularly memorable AAR, 
Gen Gray removed his rank insignia and 
then asked his junior enlisted Marines 
for a frank assessment of what did and 
did not happen during the evolution, 
why things transpired the way they did, 
Thorough after-action reviews are the critical and sometimes neglected element of the “free-
play” force-on-force training. (Photo by LCpl Anabel Abreu Rodriguez.)
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and what decisions were made (or not) 
to support the desired end state. Gray 
was always more concerned with why 
his Marines did what they did rather 
than what they did, and valuing ideas 
over rank or titles was a cornerstone of 
the maneuver philosophy.
Learning (and Wanting) to Learn
Wilson and Wyly’s experiences il-
lustrate some of the mechanisms that 
constitute a learning organization. Ju-
nior enlisted and junior officers exter-
nalized their experiences and insights 
from exercises and self-study in AARs 
and study groups, where passionate 
Marines evaluated and recombined 
this experiential knowledge into more 
refined maneuver theories that fed into 
articles in the Gazette and AWS and 2d 
MarDiv training and educational ini-
tiatives. These ideas were subsequently 
evaluated by increasingly larger audi-
ences and ultimately tested in the field, 
resulting in more experiential knowl-
edge to continue the process.
Wilson and Wyly’s experiences also 
highlight how instrumental debate and 
providing outlets for it were to the de-
velopment of maneuver theory. How-
ever, implicit in productive debate is the 
notion that ideas matter more than the 
rank or title of the person who holds 
them. Humility is thus fundamental to 
continuing to want to learn, and junior 
Marines need to be encouraged to par-
ticipate without fear of reprisal, espe-
cially since they, as sensors on the front 
lines for the organization, are likely to 
be the first ones to identify changes in 
the operational environment and the 
need to adapt—and might have even 
done so already. Honest experimenta-
tion in the field, especially in force-
on-force or “free play” exercises, as op-
posed to scripted scenarios and “proofs 
of concept” for technology, also requires 
ensuring junior Marines feel they have 
permission to make mistakes and even 
fail in order to generate feedback, test 
bounds, and promote learning.
Lastly, fundamental changes in large 
bureaucratic organizations require a 
broad base of support and investments 
in, and the efforts of, lots of people 
over long periods of time. Generating 
enthusiasm and inspiring Marines to 
live up to their professional calling as 
warrior-scholars can be more power-
ful over the long-term than simple 
incentives (not that those should be 
discarded). MCDP 7 gives Marines 
permission to take self-study and pro-
fessional discussions and development 
seriously, and in doing so, makes an 
important contribution to our ability 
to develop into a learning organization 
that can adapt to meet the demands of 
great power competition.
Notes
1. Commandant of the Marine Corps to 
Commanding General, Marine Corps Com-
bat Development Command, “Training and 
Education,” 10 October 1988, Alfred M. Gray 
Collection, Box List Part 2, Box 6, Folder 12, 
Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Center 
for Marine Corps History, Quantico, VA.
2. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Issue New Doc-
trine Prioritizing Learning,” USNI News, (May 
2020), available at https://news.usni.org.
3. Mie Augier, Sean F.X. Barrett, G.I. Wilson, 
and Michael Duncan Wyly, “Maneuver Warfare 
for the Mind: The Importance of Learning and 
Thinking to Maintaining Our Competitive 
Edge,” U.S. Naval Institute Blog, (July 2020), 
available at https://blog.usni.org.
4. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 7, Learn-
ing, (Washington, DC: 2020).
5. Michael Duncan Wyly, “Teaching Maneuver 
Warfare,” in Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, 
ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., (Novato, CA: Presi-
dio Press, 1993). Emphasis in original.
6. Wyly reflects, “The enemy became an inani-
mate object that sat immobile on the objective 
waiting to be defeated, shown graphically as a 
box colored red, in contrast to the blue friendly 
forces whose predictable courses were drawn 
with straight arrows, reflecting the certainty 
with which commanders expected to seize their 
terrain objectives. Seizing objectives was what 
the methodical battle was about, never defeat-
ing the enemy.”
7. That the board did not last is not necessarily 
a bad thing and might have even helped make it 
successful. When institutional initiatives begin 
focusing on their own survival, they tend to lose 
sight of the ideas on which they were founded. 
Additionally, given the penchant of “hot groups” 
like the Maneuver Warfare Board for disruption, 
organizations prefer to kill them off, thus neces-
sitating the protection and support of a senior 
leader. As a result, such groups are typically 
short-lived and do not last, but they can have 
out-sized, lasting impacts on organizations. It 
is thus not surprising the Maneuver Warfare 
Board similarly did not last when Gen Gray 
and others rotated to new assignments. Jean 
Lipman-Blumen and Harold J. Leavitt, “Hot 
Groups ‘With Attitude’: A New Organizational 
State of Mind,” Organizational Dynamics, (El-
sevier: Amsterdam, Spring 1993).
8. Boyd, a retired Air Force colonel, and William 
Lind, a civilian, were outsiders. This openness 
to outside ideas is central to an organization’s 
ability to avoid becoming a closed system, yet it 
is not without difficulties. Many senior Marines 
found themselves challenged by Lind, who knew 
how to debate. Wilson admired Lind’s intel-
lectual judo and his insistence on professionals 
studying their history and profession, making 
him eager to educate himself and develop as a 
professional warfighter along those lines.
9. Wilson, who was commissioned in 1972, left 
active duty for law enforcement and remained 
in the Reserves. He then returned to active duty 
in 1979.
10. Staff, “Manuever Warfare Board at Lejeune,” 
Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: October 
1981). Damian identifies the educational and 
training initiatives at AWS and Camp Lejeune as 
one of three mechanisms that helped transform 
the Marine Corps. The other two were the de-
bates in the Gazette and the strategic leadership 
of Gen Gray, Fideleon Damian, “The Road to 
FMFM 1: The United States Marine Corps 
and Maneuver Warfare Doctrine, 1979–1989,” 
(master’s thesis, Kansas State University, 2008).
11. Bill Woods cautions that reading materials 
like this can fall into the “methodical, industrial 
age” trap if they become viewed as a laundry 
list of things to do. “Illustrating vice teaching 
‘fighting smart,’” Woods posits, “is best done 
by historical example.” Bill Woods email to G.I. 
Wilson on 12 September 2020.
13. As a result, Capt Denny Long developed 
some creative logistics ideas such as refueling 
and repairing as far forward as possible instead 
of evacuating equipment to rear areas and fixed 
facilities.
>Authors’ Note: We are grateful to LtCol 
(Ret) Bill Woods for comments on a previous 
version of this article and discussions on these 
topics. Any remaining errors were produced 
without help.
